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ANTI-CHAIN STORE LEGISLATION
J. EDWARD COLLINS*
The era of the industrial depression has produced more social legislation
than any other period in the history of our country. Labor issues, farm
problems, and questions of business regulation have been prominent in the
legislative chambers of our government, federal, state and local. This period
has also'marked the growth and development of a powerful anti-chain
store movement. While it is true that its legislative origin is to be found
in some of our statute books prior to this period,' it was the depression
which really caused it to generate strength and to attain its present promi-
nence as a national, issue. 2
The purpose of this article is to trace the underlying causes which have
initiated and fostered this movement, to study the various forms which the
legislation has taken, to consider the purposes sought to be accomplished,
the measure of success or failure which the legislation has achieved, its
effect not only upon the chain store organizations, but also upon manufac-
turers, agriculturists, independent distributors auid consumers, and in general
the social desirability of such regulation.
*This article was prepared as a seminar report while the writer was a graduate
student in the Cornell Law School in 1937-38.
'As early as 1925, a city ordinance of Danville, Ky., which provided for a license
tax on cash and carry stores (a common characteristic of chain stores), was being liti-
gated in the courts, Danville v. Quaker Maid Co., 211 Ky. 677, 278 S. W. 98, 43
A. L. R. 590 (1925), and its unconstitutionality established. Two years later, Mary-
land prohibited by statute (Laws 1927, c. 554, §§ 1-3) the operation of more than 5
stores by anyone within a county, imposing a license fee on chains of over 5 stores.
The same fate met this statute in a lower Maryland Court. Keystone Stores Corp.
v. Huster, decided April 21, 1928, by a Circuit Court of Alleghany County, Equity
10922 (unreported). The same year the Public Laws of North Carolina (P. L. 1927,
c. 80, § 162) provided for a license fee on chains of over five stores. The statute was
held unconstitutional in The Great Atlantic and Pacific Tea Co. v. Doughton, 196
N. C. 145, 144 S. E. 701 (1928). A similar Georgia statute (Laws 1929, p. 71, para.
109) received the same judicial treatment in F. W. Woolworth Co. v. Harrison, 172
Ga. 179, 156 S. E. 904 (1931). Subsequently modifications were made in the North
Carolina statute after the initial attempt to tax the chains was declared invalid. N. C.
Pub. Laws 1929, c. 345, § 162; N. C. CODE ANN. (Michie 1935) § 7880 (93). This
statute differed from the previous one in that it defined a chain store as one in a
group of two or more under one management. This was upheld in The Great Atlantic
and Pacific Tea Co. v. Maxwell, 199 N. C. 433, 154 S. E. 838 (1930).
The anti-chain store movement really began, however, when the United States Su-
preme Court upheld the validity of the Indiana chain store act (Acts 1929, c. 207,
p. 693; IND. STAT. ANN. (Burns 1933) §§ 42-301 to 42-313) which imposed a gradu-
ated license tax upon chain stores. State Board of Tax Commissioners v. Jackson,
283 U. S. 527, 75 L. ed. 1248, 51 Sup. Ct. 540, 73 A. L. R. 1464 (1931). The effect
that this case has had upon such legislation is evident from the fact that, of the 25
state acts now in existence, none antedate this case.
'Despite the unusually deflated business conditions in 1930, 1931 and 1932, the net
earnings of the food chain stores maintained a comparatively constant level from
1928 to 1932. DEWING, FINANCIAL POLICY OF CORPORATIONS (3rd ed. 1934) 451. The
net earnings of The Great Atlantic and Pacific Tea Co. and The First National
Stores were greater in 1931 than they were in 1928 and 1929.
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While the chain stores in operation today are of comparatively recent
development,3 the system of having a number of distributive units under
a single management is a very ancient one.4 Indeed, Judge Terrel said in
Louis K. Liggett Co. v. Amos, 5 "We have conceived the chain store as
a product of our industrial era, but by a well established chronology its roots
sink deeper in our history, so deep in fact that it is coeval with the discovery
of America, and it may be entirely possible that Columbus provisioned the
Pinta, the Nina, and the Santa Maria from a chain store when he set out
on his famous voyage in 1492."
From the last half of the nineteenth century, our chain stores have
evolved through many stages into their present position of prominence. The
last century marked the establishment of the multiple unit distribution sys-
tem ;6 from the' turn of the century until the close of the World War was
a period of development ;7 the nineteen-twenties represent an era of rapid
growth and expansion;8 while in the nineteen-thirties is found a period of
retrenchment and contraction.
It is not insignificant that the chain store system should start to develop
at a time when feeling was running high against large combinations, and
trust busting was the popular occupation of politicians. While the multiple
unit organizations had not reached the stage where they merited the atten-
tion of these crusaders, the retail industry did not entirely escape from the
bludgeonings of the "Big Stick" or lesser sticks. Then agitation was directed
against department stores. The propaganda used against these institutions
was strikingly similar to that now employed in the war against chain stores.9
'The Great Atlantic and Pacific Tea Company, the oldest of the modern chain
stores, was established by George H. Hartford in Vesey St., New York City, in 1859.
See Furnas, Mr. George & Mr. John, SATURDAY EVENING POST, Dec. 31, 1938, p. 8.
'In 200 B. C. On Lo Kass, a Chinese merchant, had such a system of stores through-
out the Chinese Empire. In 1643 was founded a chain of apothecary stores in Japan,
which even today is a prominent organization in the drug business. Germany con-
tributed the Fugger Family, England its merchant adventurers, and early in the history
of this continent is to be found the Hudson Bay Company's chain of trading posts in
Western and Northern Canada. NICHOLS, CHAIN STORE MANUAL (1936). For a
complete history of the origin and development of chain stores, see NYSTROM, ECON1OMuCS
or RETAILING (3rd ed. 1930) Vol. 1, 213 et seq.
'104 Fla. 609, 141 So. 153 (1932).
'During this period were founded the Jones Brothers Tea Company (now the Grand
Union Tea Co.), F. W. Woolworth Co., S. S. Kresge Co., S. H. Kress Co. and the
United Cigar Stores, among others. NYSTROM, supra note 4, 215.
'The development of the automobile concentrated trading in the more populous centers.
Mass production and standardization of goods during this period fostered the develop-
ment of mass distribution.
'During this era chain stores not only increased in numbers but the volume of business
was quadrupled. Dr. Paul H. Nystrom of Columbia in Chain Stores (1930) shows
that while in 1923 chain stores accounted for 8% of the retail business, in 1929 they
did 18%. The United States Bureau of Census for 1930 reported approximately
46,000 chain stores in the grocery field doing 40% of the volume of the business.
'In a retail convention held during this period for the purpose of fostering legislation
against department stores, it was said, "The growth of this movement [department
stores] will close to thousands of young men who lack capital, the avenues of business
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The result of the agitation was anti-department store legislation in Indiana, °
Wisconsin,"' and Missouri,12 as well as a city ordinance in Chicago. 13 Diffi-
culty was experienced in the courts, however, when it was attempted to
enforce these laws,14 and within a few years the agitation subsided and
these organizations were recognized as legitimate and desirable merchandising
outlets.
From 1905 to 1916, a wave of public sentiment, fostered ostensibly in the
interest of small town independent merchants, arose against mail-order
houses. This attack was spurred on by predictions that if such mail-order
businesses were allowed to develop unmolested, the ultimate result would
be that all retail business would be carried on through the Chicago Post
Office. This agitation was never reflected in any federal legislation on
the subject and the crusade soon exhausted itself.' 5
Those engaged in direct selling have always been the subject of regulatory
legislation. 16 While the reasons given for this regulation are ostensibly
which they should find open to them, local enterprises will be stifled, millions of dol-
lars will be pulled into the already swollen coffers of Wall Street."
In commenting upon department store legislation at the 22nd annual meeting of the
American Bar Association, President Charles F. Manderson made the following observa-
tion: "Did the lawmakers desire precedent for the attempted destruction of department
stores they could have found absolute prohibition of the carrying on of more than one
business under heavy penalties, among the discarded rubbish of the English law, irk
statutes of the olden times whenthe might of kings controlled the right of subjects....
It is unnecessary to state in this presence that long ages ago these impositions upon per-
sonal liberty were consigned, with many others of like import, to the dust-heap." (1899)
22 A. B. A. REP. 249.
"
0Acts 1897, c. 70, p. 113; IND. STAT. ANN. (Burns 1901) § 3451a.
'iWs. STAT. (1897) c. 373. Repealed by Wis. STAT. (1921) c. 243, § 311.
Both the Wisconsin and the Indiana acts were passed authorizing municipalities to.
license and regulate such department stores, but neither of these acts appear to have
come up for a judicial interpretation and determination of their constitutionality.
'Mo. Acts of 1899, p. 72.
This statute provided that business in cities of over 50,000 inhabitants should be
classified into 73 different classes, embodying about everything which is the subject
of trade or barter. These classes were then divided arbitrarily into groups or grades-
It was made unlawful to expose or offer for sale, in the same establishment, under a
unit of management, goods at retail of more than one of the groups or grades without a
license of from $300 to $500 per annum for each. For one establishment to deal in
many classes would mean an amount to be paid for licenses that would be prohibitory.
'The city council of Chicago, without statutory authority tried to regulate depart-
ment stores by arbitrarily prohibiting the sale of provisions or intoxicating liquors in,
any store where dry goods, jewelry, and drugs were sold.
"In Missouri, the statute was held void in State ex rel. Wyatt v. Ashbrook, 154 Mo-
375, 55 S. W. 627, 48 L. R. A. 265 (1900). The Chicago ordinance was likewise,
declared invalid in Chicago v. Netcher, 183 Ill. 104, 55 N. E. 707, 48 L. R. A. 261 (1899),
not only because of the absence of statutory authority for the ordinance, but also because
of its violation of constitutional rights. These cases hold that regulation of business
for the sole purpose of preventing many or several kinds of goods to be sold in the
same establishment do not constitute a lawful exercise of the police power.
"BLOOMFIELD, SELECTED ARTICLES ON TRENDS IN RETAIL DISTRIBUTION (1930) 13; Ny-
STROM, mpra note 4, 207-208.
""From early times in England and America there have been statutes regulating the
occupation of itinerant peddlers, and requiring them to obtain licenses to practice their-
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found in the nature of the occupation with its annoying methods of solicita-
tiofi, its intrusive domiciliary visitations, the persistency of the salesmen in
trade." Mr. Justice Gray in Emert v. Missouri, 156 U. S. 296, 39 L. ed. 430, 15 Sup.
Ct. 367 (1895).
In England at the beginning of the eighteenth century by statutes (9 Wm. III, 1697,
c. 27; and later by ?9 Geo. III, 1789, c. 26) persons travelling from town to town with
goods and merchandise were under the control of commissioners and were required to,
secure licenses. In 1810 (50 Geo. III, c. 41) the prior acts were repealed and a
penalty was imposed upon peddlers going from town to town for the purpose of selling
merchandise at retail. A conviction was upheld under this btatute in Attorney-General
v. Tongue, 12 Price 51, 147 Eng. Rep. 653 (1823). Baron Graham said that the intent
of the statute "was to protect, on the one hand, fair traders, particularly established
shopkeepers, resident permanently in town or other places, and paying rent and taxes.
there, for local privileges from the mischiefs of being undersold by itinerant persons.
to their injury; and on the other, to guard the public from the impositions practiced
by such persons in the course of their dealings."
Statutes requiring peddlers to secure licenses were in existence in this country as
early as 1713 in Massachusetts. 7 DANE AB. 72, STATS. 1713-14, c. 7 (1 PRov. LAws
720). Today every state has some provisions for the licensing and/or taxing of those
engaged in this line of business. This is either directly done by the states or more
frequently delegated to the municipalities. Such statutes have been generally upheld
where no discrimination is made against goods which come from outside the state and_
where no distinction is made between citizens and non-citizens engaged in the business.
This power of regulation through the exercise of the police power includes also the-
power of prohibition under penalty.
In Commonwealth v. Gardner, 133 Pa. 284, 19 Atl. 550, 7 L. R. A. 666, 19 Am. St-
Rep. 645 (1890), writ of error dismissed, 149 U. S. 774, 37 L. ed. 962, 13 Sup. Ct. 1047
(1893), an act of Pennsylvania (Act of April 17, 1846, P. L. 364, § 1) which forbade
the sale of goods, wares and merchandise in the county of Schuykill by a barker or
peddler was upheld as a legitimate exercise of the police power. Of similar import
is the holding of the United States Supreme Court in Williams v. Arkansas, 217 U. S.
79, 45 L. ed. 673, 30 Sup. Ct. 493, 18 Ann. Cas. 865 (1910).
With respect to canvassers, who differ from peddlers in that they merely solicit
orders which are subsequently filled by the manufacturer or distributor, and do not
themselves carry about and dispose of goods, wares and merchandise, the cases are
not in complete unanimity. In the case of Town of Green River v. Fuller Brush Co.,
65 F. (2d) 112, 88 A. L. R. 177 (1933), it was held that an ordinance declaring the
practice of going in and upon private residences by solicitors who had not been requested
or invited by the owner or occupant, for the purpose of soliciting orders for the sale
of goods, to be a nuisance punishable as a misdemeanor was proper and a valid exer-
cise of the police power, it neither encroaching directly or indirectly upon the constitu-
tional rights of due process or equal protection, nor constituting an undue interference-
with interstate commerce, as applied to a ndn-resident solicitor of goods to be shipped
from another state. In'Real Silk Hosiery Co. v. Richmond, 298 Fed. 126 (1924), on the
other hand, a federal district court judge granted an injunction pendente lite against
the enforcement against non-resident solicitors of an ordinance imposing penalties upon-
peddlers and solicitors who ring or knock at doors of dwelling places bearing a sign,
"No Peddlers". The statute, according to the court, and particularly its application to,
the plaintiff's solicitors was an unwarranted interference with interstate commerce.
The United States Supreme Court has held, Real Silk Hosiery Mills v. Portland, 268
U. S. 325, 69 L. ed. 982, 45 Sup. Ct. 525 (1925), that a state statute which required
persons going from place to place soliciting orders for future delivery, to secure a license
and post a bond, violates the commerce clause of the Federal Constitution insofar as
it is made to apply to agents soliciting orders in a state to be filled by C. 0. D. ship-
ments from outside the state.
On the subject of solicitors and canvassers, see -Sawyer, Federal Restraint on the-
States' Power to Regulate House to House Selling (1934) 6 RocKY MT. L. REv. 85;
Hemphill, The House to House Canvasser in Interstate Commerce (1926) 60 Am. L.
REv. 641. With respect to the regulation of peddlers, see Murphy, Municipal Regulatiow
of Peddlers (1932) 4 DAK. L. REv. 121.
That legislation has not successfully wiped out peddling and canvassing is evident
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pressing the merchandise on those who most often do not wish it, and
the financial irresponsibility of transient solicitors, most regulations find
their impulse in the demands of established shopkeepers for protection from
such competition.
Similarly, chain store legislation has been to a large extent fostered by
those who were responsible for the attack against these 'other distributive
agencies. While practically everyone who has had any business interest in
retail distribution could be found, at one time or another, marching under
the banner of this movement, 17 most of the earlier adherents to such legis-
lation were subsequently weaned away and there is left as the main pro-
ponents of measures of this nature unsuccessful independent retailers, legisla-
tors harassed by the problem of raising revenue in as painless a fashion as
possible, and those who have shrewdly seen in the issue an opportunity for
financial self-enhancement.' 8
The arguments advanced by those favoring chain store legislation are
many and varied. A few of the objections are, if true, of such a nature that
they can be eradicated by legislation only by a complete suppression of this
form of distribution. Other objections are of such a character that they
can be obviated without such a drastic measure.
from the fact that those engaged in direct selling had $125,316,000 worth of net sales
in 1935, as compared to $107,813,000 in 1933 and $93,961,000 in 1929. UNITED STATES
DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE, STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF THE UNITED STATES (1937) p.
807, table no. 824.
'
7Silas H. Strawn, former president of the American Bar Association, in an address
before the National Chain Store Association stated that the flow of anti-chain store
legislation is the work of that ever busy trio, Tom, Dick, and Harry. "Tom is the
fellow who has made a failure of his store, or perhaps is still hanging on in the hope
that the father of his good wife, Mary, may soon die and leave some more money,
which he will proceed to lose in trying to be a merchant .... Dick is the local states-
man who, perhaps, owes Tom a bill and lends a sympathetic ear to Tom's harangue....
Harry is the local economist who has given special attention not to the payment of
taxes upon his property, of which he has none, but to the increase of the tax burden
upon others." Strawn, Btiting the Chain Store (1930) CHAIN STORE AGE 27. NY-
STROM, supra note 4, 262, states that the enemies of the chain stores are not only the
retail dealers but also small town newspapers patronized by the dealers, bankers whose
retail accounts dwindle, local real estate men who do not participate in handling chain
store properties, local insurance men, local painters, plumbers, fixture men, unions,
farmers, manufacturers who have failed to work out satisfactory relations with the
chains, wholesalers and travelling salesmen.
'sZIMMERMIAN, THE CHALLENGE OF CHAIN STORE DISTRIBUTION (1931) 5, points out
that in 1930 the ranks of those opposing chain stores included two radio propagandists,
three pamphleteers, 12 anti-chain store radio stations, and 24 anti-chain store newspapers
and publications.
Probably the most colorful character produced in this war was W. K. Henderson of
Shreveport, La. The owner of a radio broadcasting station (IOWKH), he discovered
that vituperative attacks on the chain stores brought him national prominence. Capi-
talizing upon this he established the Merchants' Minute Men, an association to which
any merchant could belong by simply sending $12. Later on, coffee was sold at a
dollar a pound to anyone who wanted to contribute to the cause. Needless to say the
cause proved to be a considerable source of revenue for Mr. Henderson. LEBHAR, THE
CHAIN STORE-BOON OR BANE? (1932) 183. For examples of anti-chain store news-
papers see ZIMMERMAN, op. cit. suepra, p. 3
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Some of the popular objections are that chain stores take money out of
the community and so tend to bring about its impoverishment ;19 they drive
out of business local retailers who are desirable citizens and whose interests
should be protected; they destroy the flavor of local community life by
their policies of standardization and tend to depersonalize the community,
they concentrate ownership in the hands of a few absentees, as a consequence
destroying the opportunities for young men; they are tending to produce
a "nation of clerks", as a result of their policy of centralizing control at
the home office;20 and they disorganize distribution, forcing many readjust-
mentsY thereby raising the costs of marketing.
In answer to these contentions it is pointed out that although all retailers
send most of their receipts out of the community to the manufacturers, all
have equal local expenditures for rent, light, and advertising, payrolls and
taxes; the allegedly small percentage of profit made by the chain stores whiclh
is sent out of town is more than compensated for by the savings which the
local citizens make in dealing with these stores; those in all walks of life,
desirable citizens or not, who can not survive competition of others must
fall by the wayside; the community prefers the better service and lower
prices to the picturesque small town store; a young man has more security
and better opportunity for advancement in chain stores than in business for
himself; statistics show that the chain stores have not eliminated the small
dealers, and in its own ranks it offers unlimited opportunities for young
men; the disorganization of distribution is due to the elimination of costly
methods of handling merchandise and displacing them with more efficient
ones, which is reflected in greater savings for consumers.21
It seems that the objections to the multiple store system, if they are well
founded, can not be successfully cured by legislation because they arise
from the very nature of the organization. The only remedy for them lies
"For an excellent elaboration of this argument, see an editorial in the Michigan
Tradesman, April 13, 1929, Modern Merchant and Grocery World. LEBHAR, supra note18; Palmer, Economic and Social Aspects of Chain Stores (July, 1929) Vol. II, no. 3,
JouRx. or Bus. OF THE UNIV. OF CHI.; Vol. 9, no. 3, BULL. OF THE UNIV. OF Ky., Marclt
1, 1930, p. 126.
'Mr. Justice Brandeis dissenting in Liggett Co. v. Lee, 288 U. S. 517, 568, 77 L. ed.929, 955, 53 Sup. Ct. 481, 497, 85 A. L. R. 699, 725 (1933) : "They [the citizens of the,
state of Florida] may have believed that the chain store, by furthering the concentra-
tion of wealth and power and by promoting absentee ownership, is thwarting Americarrideals; that it is converting independent tradesmen into clerks; that it is sapping the
resources, the vigor and the hope of the smaller cities and towns." On the evils of large
corporations generally see VEBLIN, ABSENTEE OWNERSHIP AND BUsINESS ENTERPRISE(1923) 86; BERLE AND MEANS, THE MODERN CORPORATION AND PRIVATE PROPERTY(1932) 46.2
FRYBERGER, THE ABOLITION OF POVERTY (1931) ; FLOWERS, AMERICA CHAINED(1931); CAMERON, OuR JUGGERNAUT (1932); Palmer, supra note 19; ZImmER-
MAN, supra note 18; LEBHAR, supra note 18, at 59. For an excellent portrayal of the
transition which has taken place in the small towns in the last twenty-five years seeSprague, The ChaihtStore Mind, Reflections of a Shopkeeper, HAIP's MAGAZINE,.
February, 1929.
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in the complete elimination of the system. Whether they are serious enough
to warrant such drastic action in view of the acknowledged advantages of this
form of distribution is distinctly questionable.
Chain stores have also been charged with lowering the wage scale of
labor throughout the country by paying their employees low wages. An
impartial investigation discloses the fact that while the salaries paid by such
organizations are not munificent they compare very favorably with salaries
generally paid in the retail distribution field. The average wage of employees
in independent stores in 1929 was $1,309; in the same year the wages paid
by the chain stores averaged $1,345. During the depression, however, while
the wages for independents dropped off 27.5%o in 1933, the reduction in
chain store salaries was 19.8%o to $1,079.22 At all events the solution of
a wage problem would seem to lie in labor legislation rather than in legis-
lation which burdens the industry or tends to extinguish it.
Another objection urged is that chain stores do not actually save money
for the consumer; the popular impression that their prices are lower than
those of the independent is the result of the use of "loss leaders", and not
based upon fact; that the chain stores practice such unfair competition in
order to destroy the independent merchant.
That the chain stores do actually sell at lower prices than independents
and chains of co-operative independent merchants, now seems beyond dispute.
Investigations on this subject not only by economists23 and universities2 4
but also by the Federal Trade Commission make this quite clear.25 All
=BusiNEss WEEK, Feb. 9, 1935, p. 23.
'John T. Flynn, noted economist and author, in a study reported in NEw REPUnLIc,
April 22, 1931, found that chains undersell independents on coffee, butter, bread, sugar
and eggs from twelve to twenty-three percent.
In a survey made by Edward G. Ernst and Emil M. Hartl, economists with strong
views against chain stores, it was found that in ten cities ranging in population from
five to ninety thousand, prices on 124 standard items showed independents to be 7.3%higher, while in 400 different brands of canned goods chain store prices were 11%
lower than independents' retail prices. THE NATION, Nov. 12, 1930.
'Professor Edgar Z. Palmer of the University of Kentucky conducted a survey in
Lexington, Ky. He found that in dealing with chain stores the housewife saves
slightly more than 14 cents on every dollar. Vol. 9, no. 3, BULL. OF THE UNIV. OF Ky.,
March 1, 1930, p. 109.
Prof. Malcolm D. Taylor, Associate Professor of Marketing at the University of
North Carolina conducted a survey of Durham, N. C. He found that the averageprices of all chain stores were 13.75% lower than the average of all independent stores.
HARV. Bus. REv., July 1930.
Dr. James T. Palmer, Professor of Marketing at the University of Chicago, con-
ducted a survey in that city. In this investigation chain store prices were compared
with cash and carry independents and service independents. It was found that on aver-
age prices for 75 items the chain stores undersold cash and carry independents by
9.32% and service independents by 11.39%. NEw REPUBLIC, April 29, 1931, p. 270.
An investigation made in Shreveport, La. and Newark, N. J., showed that chains
saved customers from ten to fifteen cents on the dollar. A study made in Canastota,Cazenovia, Hamilton, Earlville and Sherbourne, showed that chains were 10% below
voluntary chains, which were underselling the regular independents by 1.5%. NicHOLS,
supra note 4.
'The Federal Trade Commission made a study of retail selling prices of chain
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studies of prices have proved chain store prices to be much lower, usually
about ten per cent.
It is often vigorously contended, and not unreasonably so, that the chain
stores have exerted undue influence in their buying, frequently compelling
manufacturers to sell at less than cost;26 that they tend toward monopoly,
and if allowed to develop, will control prices ;27 and that they do not bear
their full share of the local tax burden.
28
stores and other distributors in Washington, Cincinnati, Memphis and Detroit. In the
Washington survey, statistics were secured from 570 independent and cooperative gro-
cery stores. Four hundred forty-eight items were listed for pricing. The chain stores in-
volved were Sanitary Grocery Co., the Great Atlantic and Pacific Tea Co., and the
American Stores. It was found that the independents were 6.4% higher than the chain
stores. SEN. Doc. No. 62, 73d Cong., 1st Sess. (1933). In Memphis by a comparison
of prices in The Kroger Grocery and Baking Co. and the Clarence Saunders Stores,
Inc., and the independents, it was found that the prices for the independent grocery stores
were 8.28% higher than for the chain stores. SEN. Doc. No. 69, 73d Cong., 1st Sess.
(1933). In Detroit the chains studied were Kroger, A. and P., C. F. Smith Co. and
National Groceterias. The prices for the independent grocery stores were found to be
10.47% higher than for the chain stores. SEN. Doc. No. 81, 73d Cong., 1st Sess. (1933).
In Cincinnati the chain store prices were taken from Kroger, A. and P., Burke Gro-
cery Co. and the Voss Grocery Co. It was found that the prices of the independent
grocery stores were 8.84% higher than those of the larger chains and 9.85% higher
than those of the smaller chains. SEN. Doc. No. 88, 73d Con., 1st Sess. (1933).
'Federal Trade Commission, Final Report on the Chain Store Investigation, SEN.
Doc. No. 4, 74th Cong., 1st Sess.(1935) 24; H. R. REP. No. 2287, part 1, 74th Cong.,
2d Sess. (1936) 3-4 contains evidence of price discrimination in favor of chain stores.
See comment, The Robinson-Patman Act in Action (1937) 46 YALE L. J. 447.
In the hearing against the Great Atlantic and Pacific Tea Company before the Fed-
eral Trade Commission in 1937, it was brought out that the chain bought Fleish-
mann's yeast at 18 cents per pound whereas small bakers paid as much as 25 cents.
When Del Monte refused to give the discount demanded, the A. and P. clerks were
ordered to substitute other brands for Del Monte, buying was cut to a hand-to-mouth
basis to annoy the California Packing Co. (Del Monte) as much as possible. TIME,
April 12, 1937, p. 86. See ZIMMERMAN, supra note 18, 168.
'The United States Bureau of Census in cooperation with the Chamber of Commerce
of the United States made a study of 11 cities in 1927. It was found that the chain
stores report sales of 28% of the total retail trade. This ranged from 6.3% in Fargo,
N. D., to 37.1% in Chicago. NysTrom, supra note 4, 366. In 1935, however, the Depart-
ment of Commerce Census of Business showed that the chain stores accounted for only
22% of the total retail volume in the U. S. and owned only about 8% of the stores.
LITERARY DIGEST, May 29, 1937.
A. C. Hoffman of the Bureau of Agricultural Economics and L. A. Bevan of the N.
J. College ot Agriculture made a survey of chain store distribution of fruits and vege-
tables in the northeastern states under the auspices of the U. S. Dep't of Agriculture
in 1937. They state: "Insofar as the facts developed by this study warrant a conclu-
sion, there is no evidence that the chain systems are in a position to exercise any sig-
nificant degree of monopolistic control over the marketing of fruits and vegetables at
the present time. The chains taken together are not retailing more than 30% to 35%
of the total supply consumed in any of the cities studied, and no single chain has more
than 10% to 12% of this total supply. The field of retailing is among the most com-
petitive to be found anywhere in the economic system, despite the tremendous growth
of the chains in recent years . . . . competition in grocery retailing is not less active
than it was ten or fifteen years ago."
On the question of the possibility of the chain store growing to a monopoly, see
ZIMMERMAN, supra note 18, 272, where it is contended that chains will never dominate
distribution, for the reason that the personnel problem places definite limitations on
chain store growth.
'The chains are said to pay less personal property tax than their independent corn-
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I
Let us now pass from the various objections which have been leveled
against this form of enterprise, to study what legislation has been enacted
and the effect which it has had in the removing of these objections. Let us
consider first the state license taxes on chain stores, generally referred to
as state anti-chaift store taxes.
State chain store taxes are of two main types.29 The most prevalent type"0
is a license tax on each store of the chain located in the state which is
graduated according to the number of stores operated by the chain within
the state.8 1 The second type of tax is in the form of a graduated fee based
on gross receipts.
Prior to the decision of the United States Supreme Court in State Board
of Tax Cotmissioners of Ivdiana v. Jackson,32 some question existed as to
the validity of license taxes which made a distinction between chain dealers
and independent retailers.88 This case held there was a sufficient difference
petitors, owing largely to faster turnover, to the exclusion of wholesaling and trans-
portation costs when valuing goods, and to the inaccessibility of books to local
assessors. FAcING THE TAX PROBLEM (Twentieth Century Fund, Inc., 1937) 503.
Hardy, Legal and Economic Aspects of Chain Store Taxation in Wisconsin (1934) 9
Wis. L. Rlv. 382, 12 TAX MAG. 605; Krueger, The Taxation of Chain Stores, With
Special Reference to Wisconsin (1933) 11 TAx MAG. 412.
'There are a few miscellaneous types of taxes that can not be classified under these
two forms. Delaware (Laws 1917, c. 13; DEL. REv. CODE (1935) Art. 14, c. 6) has a
tax of $10 plus 10 cents per $100 of aggregate cost value of goods received in excess
of $5,000. Tennessee, as well as having a "Merchants' License Tax", has a chain store
tax (TENN. CODE ANN. (Williams Supp. 1938) § 1248.121) which, after exempting the
first store, assesses the second and succeeding stores $3 per 100 square feet of floor
space in each store. Virginia has a graduated tax (VA. TAX CODE (Michie 1936) § 188)
on wholesalers' purchases of $50 plus 13 cents per $100 on excess over $10,000.
""Twenty-one states now have this type of chain store tax.
'The Louisiana tax, unlike any of the others, graduates the fee on the stores within
the state in proportion to the total number of the stores in the chain whether located
within or without the state. (LA. GEN. STAT. ANN. (Dart 1932) §§ 8664-8674).
Indiana has a typical statute (Laws of 1929, c. 207; IND. STAT. ANN. (Burns 1933)
Tit. 42, c. 3) with a tax rate of $7 for the first store; 2nd to the 5th, $10 each; 6th to
10th, $20 each; llth to the 20th, $30 each; 2 1st and succeeding, $150 each, with a filing
fee of 50 cents for each store payable annually.
'283 U. S. 527, 75 L. ed. 1248, 51 Sup. Ct. 540, 73 A. L. R. 1464 (1931).
'The first case involving this question was Danville v. Quaker Maid Co., 211 Ky.
677, 278 S. W. 98, 43 A. L. R. 590 (1925), where a city ordinance provided for a
license and occupational tax with certain classifications being made and different rates
imposed. The classes were: (1) regular service grocery stores not employing more
than two employees, which were subject to a tax of $12 per year and $5 for each addi-
tional employee; (2) cash and carry grocery stores, not self-service and employing not
more than two persons, which were subjected to a license tax of $50 per year and $25
for each additional employee; and (3) self-service, cash and carry grocery stores not
employing more than two persons, on which grocery stores the license fee was $40
per year and $30 for each additional employee. Appellee was a cash and carry grocery
store. It was held that the slight difference in the detail of conducting the business
afforded no reasonable ground for classifying appellee on a basis of taxation different
from that of the ordinary grocery store, and that consequently the ordinance was dis-
criminatory and not uniform. A similar statute in Georgia subsequently met the same
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between these types of stores to support the distinction in the taxation and
that consequently it could not be branded as arbitrary and unreasonable,."
although the minority opinion declared the difference to be merely one of
degree and not of kind. Since the decision has been subsequently fol-
lowed, the validity of such taxes now is unquestioned.
In the same year that the Jackson case was decided, Florida passed a law3 5
enacting a graduated license tax on chain stores. One set of rates was
fixed for chains operating solely in one county and a separate and higher
rate was fixed for those which were operated in more than one county.
The legality of this statute was tested in the United States Supreme Court
fate. Douglas v. Southern Grocery Co., 180 Ga. 519, 179 S. E. 768, 99 A. L. R. 700
(1935).
In the next case, The Great Atlantic and Pacific Tea Co. v. Doughton, 196 N. C.
145, 144 S. E. 701 (1928), a North Carolina statute (Pub. Laws 1927, c. 80, § 162)
provided that the management of six or more stores should pay a license tax of $50 in
the state for the privilege of operating and maintaining the same. The court held the
statute invalid on the ground that there was no substantial difference between chain
and other types of stores. In a concurring opinion it was stated that the tax is laid
on chain stores only insofar as there are six or more stores under the same manage-
ment or ownership. Five could be maintained free of tax but if the number be increased
to six, not only would the sixth be taxed but the first five also, and as a consequence
the tax was retroactive. The case was noted in (1928) 4 NOTRE DAME LAWY. 207;
(1929) 77 U. oF PA. L. REv. 426; (1929) 3 TEMPLE L. REV. 322; (1929) 7 TENN. L.
Rav. 316.
In 1929, however, the statute was changed (N. C. Pub. Laws 1929, c. 345, § 162)
so that every business operating or maintaining two or more ;tores where merchandise
was sold at retail was deemed to be a chain store and a $50 tax was levied on each such
store in excess of one. This act was upheld in The Great Atlantic and Pacific Tea
Co. v. Maixwell, 199 N. C. 433, 154 S. E. 838 (1930), the court declaring that there
was a real and substantial difference between merchants who exercise the privilege of
carrying on their business by means of two or more stores and those who maintain and
operate only one store. The previous case was distinguished on the grounds stated in
the concurring opinion. The case was noted in (1930) 34 LAW NoTas 173; (1930) 9
N. C. L. REv. 64; (1931) 15 MiNN. L. REv. 341; (1931) 37-W. VA. L. Q. 220; (1931)
5 TEMPLE L. Q. 461; (1931) 26 ILL. L. REv. 240.
"Mr. Justice Roberts said: ". . . There are many points of difference between chain
stores and independently owned units. These consist in quantity buying, which involves
the application of the mass process to distribution, comparable to the mass method used
in production; buying for cash and obtaining the advantage of a cash discount; skill
in buying, so as not to overbuy, and at the same time keep the stores stocked with
products suitable in size, style and quality for the neighborhood customers who patronize
them; warehousing of goods and distributing from a single warehouse to numerous
stores; abundant supply of capital, whereby advantages may be taken of opportunities
for establishment of new units; a greater turnover to ascertain relative profits on vary-
ing items; unified, and therefore cheaper and better advertising for the entire chain
in a given locality; standard terms of display for the promotion of sales; superior man-
agement and method; concentration of management in the special lines of goods handled
by the chain; special accounting methods; standardization of store management, sales
policies and goods sold."
The case was widely noted, (1931) 9 N. Y. U. L. Q. REV. 94; (1931) 18 VA. L. Rav.
72; (1931) 17 IOWA L. REv. 72; (1931) 11 ORE. L. REV. 99; (1931) 10 TEx. L. Ryv.
101; (1931) 7 IND. L. J, 179; (1931) 2 IDAHO L. J. 59; (1932) 12 B. U. L. REv. 310;
(1932) 27 ILL. L. REv. 89. The case Was subsequently followed in a per curiam decision
in The Great Atlantic and Pacific Tea Co. v. Maxwell, 284 U. S. 575, 76 L. ed. 500,
52 Sup. Ct. 26 (1931); and also in a memorandum opinion in The Great Atlantic
and Pacific Tea Co. v. Morrissett, 284 U. S. 584, 76 L. ed. 506, 52 Sup. Ct. 127 (1931).
'Fla. Laws 1931, c. 15, 624.
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in Louis K. Liggett Co. v. Lee3 6 and it was declared to be unconstitutional.
In the majority opinion, Mr. Justice Roberts declared that there was no
basis for the classification between a chain with all stores in one county
and a chain where only one of its stores was in another county. "The
classification is solely of different chains, and the difference between them
consists neither in number, size, surrounding population, nor in any factor
having a conceivable relation to the privilege enjoyed. '" 37
In the following year, Fox v. Standard Oil of N. J.38 raised the question
of the validity of a tax where the rate was so high that it equalled the net
earnings of the taxpayer. "The state may make the tax so heavy as to
discourage multiplication of the units to such an extent believed to be inordi-
nate and by the incidence of the burden develop other forms of industry. If
only one form of chain chooses so to multiply its units, after having arrived
at the topmost levels, as to make the burden heavy, it owes its position
on the scale and the aggravation of the tax to the exigencies of the business
and not to those of law."
The most recent case on this type of legislation involved the validity of a
Louisiana tax statute,39 which provided for a graduated tax on chain stores
measured by the total number of stores in the chain whether situated within
or without the state. In Great Atlantic and Pacific Tea Co. v. Grosjean,40
such a statute was declare valid. The classification was held based not upon
the location of the stores (as in the Liggett case) within or without the
state, but upon the magnitude of the business, the advantages accompanying
it and its economic results.
41
Many municipalities, as well as states, have imposed graduated license
taxes upon chain stores.42 While some lower courts have declared such
-288 U. S. 517, 77 L. ed. 929, 53 Sup. Ct. 481, 85 A. L. R. 699 (1933).
'See (1933) 33 COL. L. Rkv. 754; (1933) 17 MIlN. L. Rav. 676; (1933) 81 U. OF
PA. L. ZEv. 722; (1933) 13 B. U. L. REv. 558; (1933) 28 ILL. LAw Rav. 288; (1933)
17 MARQ. L. Rav. 296; (1933) 10 N. Y. U. L. Q. REv. 551.
Mr. Justice Brandeis dissented in part on the ground that since all the taxpayers
in this case were corporations foreign to the state of Florida, they could be subjected
to a statute of this kind. "Since a State may fix the price for the privilege of doing intra-
state commerce in corporate form, the State may make the price higher for the privi-
lege of locating stores in two counties than in one."
Mr. Justice Cardozo likewise wrote a dissenting opinion. "Students of the chains
have accepted the classification of the Census Bureau which divides them [chain stores]
into three groups, local, sectional and national. . . .There is a definite line of cleavage
between chains that serve customers within a single territorial unit and those framed
for larger ends. . . . Where does the local have an end and the non-local a beginning?
The legislature had to draw the line somewhere and it drew it with the county. Within
the range of reasonable discretion its judgment must prevail."
'294 U. S. 87, 79 L. ed. 780, 55 Sup. Ct. 333 (1935), noted in (1935) 2 U. OF CHi. L.
REV. 480; (1935) 10 IND. L. J. 462; (1935) 13 TEx. L. Rav. 469; (1936) 9 So. CAL. L.
REv. 166.,
ILA. GEN. STAT. ANN. (Dart 1932) §§ 8664-8674.
' 301 U. S. 412, 81 L. ed. 1193, 57 Sup. Ct. 772, 112 A. L. R. 293 (1937).
"1(1937) 21 MiNN. L. REV. 847; (1937) 37 COL. L. Rav. 1231; (1937) 26 GEo. L. 3.
163; (1937) 23 WAsE. U. L. Q. 136.
'Hamtramck, Michigan, imposed a license tax upon retail establishments which was
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ordinances unconstitutional because confiscatory,43 the supreme courts of
Oregon, Virginia and South Carolina have upheld such regulation on the
basis on which the state statutes have been sustained. 44
The second type of chain store tax which the states have imposed, a tax
on gross receipts, has been nullified by court decisions. A Kentucky statute
of this nature was held invalid in Stewart Dry Goods Co. v. Lewis,45 because
the classification of vendors solely by reference to the volume of their trans-
actions denied the equal protection of the laws. The tax on a sale was held
to be a tax on the goods itself, which is required to be uniform by the
Federal Constitution; here the rate was not uniform but was graduated
progressively on the basis of sales volume, and not being a net income tax,
it was bad.46  In Valentine v. The Great Atlantic and Pacific Tea Co.,4 7
the Iowa statute48 provided for both a gross sales tax and a graduated
license tax. The United States Supreme Court upheld the license tax and
declared the gross sales tax unconstitutional on the basis of the Stewart
case. These decisions have been followed in all the courts where the
issue has been presented. 49  As a result this type of statute has been
discarded.
Another discrimination against chain stores is to be found in a few states,
graduated to $1,000. Similar ordinances exist in Portland, Ore., St. Louis, Knoxville,
Durhaim and Charlotte, N. C., Spartanburg, S. C., and Maplewood, Mo. Bus. WEEK,
Jan. 11, 1933, p. 23; June 22, 1932, p. 9.
Apparently Augusta and Athens, Ga., are planning a municipal chain store tax similar
in principle to that used in Louisiana. N. Y. Times, Nov. 27, 1938, § 3, p. 9.3The Maplewood ordinance was held unconstitutional by the circuit court of the
county of St. Louis, in Kroger Grocery and Baking Co. v. City of Maplewood (1933)
Case No. 98057 (unreported) and the Hamtramck tax was declared unconstitutional
as being confiscatory and beyond the power of the municipality in Kroger Grocery and
Baking Co. v. City of Hamtramck (1932) Circuit Court, Wayne County, Mich., No.
200, 825 (unreported). Judge Richter states, "There can be little doubt of the uncon-
stitutionality of the ordinance itself. Whatever are the rights of the city to regulate
food stores, they cannot, under the guise of regulation or taxation, enact an ordinance
calling for the payment of different amounts for the same privilege, that of operating
one store, just because one, two, three or four stores may be operated in addition to
that one. This is an arbitrary, unjust, and illegal classification."
"Safeway Stores Inc. v. City of Portland, 149 Ore. 581, 42 P. (2d) 162 (1935);
Fredericksburg v. Sanitary Grocery Co., 168 Va. 57, 190 S. E. 318 (1937) ; The Great
Atlantic and Pacific Tea Co. v. City of Spartanburg, 170 S. C. 262, 170 S. E. 273
(1933). See Cotitutionality of State Chain Store Tax Based on Totat Number of
Stores (1935) 44 YALE L. J. 619.
'1294 U. S. 550, 79 L. ed. 1054, 55 Sup. Ct. 525 (1935).
"'See the comment on this case in (1936) 36 COL. L. REv. 1366; also notes in (1935)
35 COL. L. REv. 606; (1935) 30 ILL. L. Rav. 110; (1935) 83 U. oF PA. L. REV. 1024;
(1935) 48 HARV. L. Rav. 1434; (1935) 19 MaRQ. L. REv. 258; (1935) 41 W. VA. L.
Q. 422; (1935) 13 TEX. L. Rav. 469; (1935) 33 MIcnr. L. REv. 1278; (1935) 21 LA.
L. REv. 93; (1935) 20 MiNN. L. Rav. 89; (1936) 4 DuKE BAR Asso. J. 42; (1936) 9
So. CAL. L. REv. 167.
"7299 U. S. 32, 81 L. ed. 22, 57 Sup. Ct. 56 (1936).
SIOwA CODE (1935) c. 329, G. 1.
"Similar Acts were declared invalid in Wisconsin, Schuster v. Henry, 218 Wisc. 506,
261 N. W. 20 (1935), and in Vermont, The Great Atlantic and Pacific Tea Co. v.
Harvey, 107 Vt. 215, 177 Atl. 423 (1935).
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in the form of a tax on the distribution of goods from chain store ware-
houses at a rate corresponding to that imposed upon wholesalers. Such
statutes have been upheld in both Tennessee and Virginia. 0
It appears that the purposes to be accomplished by such legislation are:
first, the raising of revenue; second, the complete elimination of chain stores
in the state; third, an equalization of the tax burden on chain and inde-
pendent stores; fourth, the equalization of the competitive advantages
which the chains have by virtue of their size.51
The need for revenue seems to be the dominant factor in the spread of
such taxes. The movement was begun and developed during the depression
years. The tax is collected comparatively easily, and there is no doubt but
that the chain stores are a class which can readily pay taxes. It is to be
noted that these tax measures are to be found mostly in the south and
mid-west where personal income taxes and property taxes as sources of
'TENN. CODE ANN. (Williams 1934) § 1248.66. The Virginia statute (VA. TAX
CODE (Michie, 1930) § 188) provides as follows: "For every distributing house or place
in this state (other than the house or place of manufacture) operated by any person,
firm or corporation engaged in the business of a merchant in this state, for the purpose
of distributing goods, wares and merchandise among his or its retail stores, a separate
merchant's license shall be required and the goods, wares and merchandise distributed
through such distributing house or place shall be regarded as purchases for the purpose
of measuring the license tax." This- act was upheld in Comm. v. Bisbee Grocery Co., 135
Va. 935, 151 S. E. 293 (1930) ; and again in The Great Atlantic and Pacific Tea Co. v.
Morrissett, 58 F. (2d) 991 (1930), aff'd, 284 U. S. 584. See Constitutionality of State
Chain Store Tax Based on Total Number of Stores (1935) 44 YALE L. J. 619.
On the general subject of chain store legislation in the various states, see Becker
and Hess, The Chain, Store License Tax and the 14th Ainendmen6 (1929)' 7 No. CAP-
L. REv. 115; Simms, Chain Stores and the Courts (1931) 17 VA. L. REv. 313; Hoge,
Power to Tax Chain Stores (1931) 37 W. VA. L. Q. 220; Shapiro, A Study in Chain-
ing the Chain Stores (1933) 7 ST. JOHN'S L. REv. 350; Krueger, The Taxation of Chain
Stores (1933) 11 TAX MAG. 412; Recent Chain Store Taxes Based on Volume of
Business (1935) 45 YALE L. J. 314; (1931) 80 U. OF PA. L. REV. 289; (1936) 36 CoL.
L. REv. 1366.
'Of all the chain store statutes, the Florida Act appears to be the sole one contain-
ing a declaration of policy. It is as follows (Acts 1935, 16,848, § 1): "It is hereby
determined and declared that extensive revenues are required to promote education and
to preserve the common school system of the State of Florida; and that in the raising of
such revenue it is expedient to levy a privilege tax upon the occupation of engaging
in and continuing in the business of operating retail stores in the State of Florida ..... ;
and that due to the greater specialization in management and methods, the advantages
of mass buying, of intensive selling, of more efficient utilization of capital assets, of the
specialized character of their merchandising and the more efficient coverage and results
obtained from their advertising, stores operated in multiple units enjoy an advantage
over individually owned and operated single stores to the extent that it is fit and proper
that such stores should be separately classified for the purpose of such privilege taxa-
tion; and further, that the increasing growth of chains and greater multiplication of
units of stores tend to foster monopoly and to create unemployment by driving out of
business their competitors who do not enjoy such advantages and that therefore the
multiplication and extension of such units of chain stores should be discouraged as a
matter of public policy."
Many of the other statutes provide that the revenue raised in this way shall be dis-
bursed for educational or charitable purposes. Still others merely place it in the gen-
eral treasury.
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revenue were most unproductive during deflated conditions. As a conse-
quence this tax proved to be distinctly popular.52
In some states, however, the chief objective seemed to be the driving out
of such multiple unit distributive associations rather than the raising of
revenue. This is the only conclusion that can be drawn from the tax rate'
fixed by the Texas act. 3 This act provides for a $750 tax for each store of
the chain over fifty. While rates under the Pennsylvania act54 are not
quite as steep as the Texas one, it is more deadly because the stores located
in the state are more numerous. The Louisiana tax55 is fixed at $550 for
each store in the state if the chain of which it is a member is composed
of more than five hundred stores, wherever located. There is some indica-
tion that these statutes have been successful in reducing the number of units
in these states.56
Because bf their mass purchases, their mass distribution system and their
mass advertising, it is indisputable that the chain stores have an advantage
over the independent dealer who is not in a position to secure similar bene-
fits. 57 Since these benefits increase with size, the tax which seeks to minimize
the advantage of chain stores over independents should be measured by the
'The tax yield for 1937 on chain stores amounted to $5,045,943, a relatively unimport-
ant figure, being even less than the 8 millions collected from admission taxes. Florida
collected the largest amount on this tax, $2,127,169, while Louisiana received only $20,084
from this source. The Texas statute is presently in litigation and the enforcement of
it has been enjoined and consequently no collections have been made. No figures are
yet available on the revenue collected by Pennsylvania. Vol. 5 TAX POLICy, No. 1, Nov.-
Dec. 1937, pp. 3 and 7.
The revenue raised by this tax is most insignificant when compared with the receipts
from other tax sources. Thus in Alabama the chain store tax produced $118,695 while
a sales tax in operation between Jan. 1, and Sept. 30, 1937 yielded $3,104,840. Indiana
raised 20 million by sales taxes and a half million by chain store taxes. Louisiana
with its exceptionally high chain store tax secured more than ten times as much
revenue through soft drink taxes as from this source. Id. 10.
For a somewhat earlier view of the chain store tax as a revenue raising measure, see
Farber, State Taxation of Chain Stores (1934) 12 TAX MAG. 10, where the writer con-
cludes that up until that time it had been distinctly disappointing.
13Tex. Laws 1935, 1st Spec. Sess., c. 400.
"PA. STAT. ANN. (Purdon Supp. 1938) tit. 2, §§ 3420-1 to 3420-11.
LA. GEN. STAT. ANN. (Dart 1932) §§ 8664-8674.
'The Great Atlantic and Pacific Tea Co.'s annual tax bill in Pennsylvania under the
tax was estimated at $1,050,000 per year. After the bill was passed the A. and P.
closed 80 stores in and around Philadelphia; P. H. Butler Co. closed 50 of its 200 units,
and the American Stores closed about 70 stores with a definite promise not to reopen,
thus cutting its tax bill of more than $850,000 by $35,000. TIME, June 14, 1937, p. 68.
In Louisiana the A. and P.'s annual tax bill on its original 3,000 units was $1,650,000.
LITERARY DIEST, June 12, 1937, p. 36. The effect of this tax is evident from the fact
that only $200,000 was the revenue produced by it in the last taxable year.
When Iowa enacted its chain store law in 1935 (IowA Coax (1935) c. 329, G. 1),
the Standard Oil Co. of Indiana decided that its 850 service stations in the state could
not stand the increased tax burden, so the firm rented its retail outlets to individuals
and turned all leased stations back to their owners.
"See opinion of Mr. Justice Roberts in State Board of Tax Commissioners of Indiana
v. Jackson, supra notes 32 and 34, for a list of the advantages of chain stores over
independent dealers.
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size of the entire organization, and not merely by the number of stores
operating in the state.58 The only state which has a tax act which takes this
factor into consideration is Louisiana. All the others disregard it so that
a national chain with national purchasing power and national advertising,
and a local chain with a lesser purchasing and advertising power, both having
the same number of outlets in the state must pay the same tax.
Although it is conceded that the chain stores pay a minimum of personal
property taxes because of their comparatively small inventories and frequent
turnover of stock; that their distribution costs are generally charged to
overhead rather than added to the purchase price of goods coming into the
stores, lowering the recorded costs of inventory; and that it is difficult
to determine what these costs are inasmuch as the books are usually kept
out of the state, still Wisconsin is the only state which has attempted to
remedy this situation through its chain store tax.59  It was believed that
this condition, which actually amounted to a tax subsidy to chain stores,
could be cured through a gross receipts tax. The adoption of this method,
which subsequently prove unconstitutional, did not remedy the situation.
Other attempts at the solution of the problem were abandoned. Rather
than experiment with new legislation, the method of chain store taxation
which had met with the approval of the United States Supreme Court was
adopted.
Such legislation tends to prevent the chain stores from achieving the
monopoly which it is alleged would be theirs if allowed to continue un-
impeded. The chain stores now have to bear a larger share of the tax
burden than formerly, though the new levy bears no justifiable relationship
to the previous personal property tax deficiency. It is difficult to see how
any of the objections which were made to the chain stores have been met.
That the benefits of this legislation are worth the price which undoubtedly
must be paid in a higher cost of living is distinctly questionable. 0
'See dissenting opinion of Mr. Justice Cardozo in Louis K. Liggett Co. v. Lee, supra
note 36. Mr. Justice Roberts in The Great Atlantic and Pacific Tba Co.
v. Grosjean, supra note 40: "The facts found respecting the advantages of a larger chain
as compared with a smaller justify as not unreasonable or arbitrary the imposition of
a higher license tax on the units of the former which are maintained within the state.
Even one unit of such a national chain located irl Louisiana enjoys competitive advan-
tages over the stores of the local proprietor consequent to its relation to the far-flung
activities and facilities of the chain." The proposed Schwartzwald Bill in N. Y. is of
this nature.
€'See Hardy, supra note 28; Krueger, supra note 28.
'Chain stores did not expand to such great lengths in Europe as they did in this
country. In Germany they figure in about 4% of the total value of the national retail
business. Mele and Luporini, CommERzio, (No. 9, Sept. 1936). In this article the
Italian situation is analyzed, with the finding that the uniform price system offers indis-
putable advantages to the consumer. In France anti-chain store legislation has been
adopted (Law of March 1936) and restrictions have been made in Belgium. TRADE
REG. REv. (Dec. 1936) p. 15.
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The price discrimination laws and the sales below cost acts are other
types of state legislation directly bearing upon the welfare of chain stores.
Price discrimination statutes are found in twelve states.61 These acts
make it unlawful to sell a commodity at a lower price in one place in a
state than in any other place after due allowances have been made for
variances in costs in the different localities for transportation of the mer-
chandise, where the tendency of such a sale at a lowered price-is to destroy
competition.6 2  While lowering a price to meet competitive rates in good
faith is permitted under some of these statutes,6 3 the regulation injures the
chain store organizations because they can not reduce the price of a commodity
in a metropolitan area, or portion thereof, to stimulate business without
also reducing the price all over the state. It is difficult to see how anyone
can hope to increase his own business in the retail field without intending
to kill some of his competitors.
In the case of Great Atlantic and Pacific Tea Co. v. Ervin,63 1 the United
State District Court for Minnesota declared unconstitutional that part of
the Minnesota Unfair Trade Practices Actab which prohibited sales in any
'Ariz., Ark., Calif., Colo., Iowa, Minn., Neb., and Wyo. have basically similar statutes
on price discrimination. Those in Idaho, Oregon and Utah are modelled on the Rob-
inson-Patman Act. It is interesting from the jurisprudential point of view to observe
the geographical location of these states. Of this group, Colo., Iowa, Minn., and Mont.
have chain store taxes; California had suci an act but it was repealed by a
referendum.
'The Arkansas act dating back to 1921 provides (Aax. CoDE (1921) c.
177): "Any person, firm, company, association or corporation, foreign or domestic,
doing business in the State of Arkansas, and engaged in buying any product or com-
modity in general use for manufacturing or other purposes; or engaged in the produc-
tion, manufacture or distribution of any commodity in general use, that shall intention-
ally, for the purpose of destroying the business of a competitor in any locality,
discriminate between different sections, communities or cities of this State, in buying
at a higher price or by selling such commodity at a lower rate in one section, com-
munity or city, than is paid or charged for said commodity by said party in another
section, community, or city, after making due allowance for the difference, if any, in
the grade or quality, and in the actual cost of transportation from the point of buying
or of production, if a raw product, or from the point of manufacture, if a manufactured
product, shall be deemed guilty of unfair discrimination, which is hereby prohibited and
declared unlawful. The buying at a higher price or selling at a lower price in one
locality, community, or city than the party or parties pay for or sell a like commodity
or article in another locality, city or community shall be prima facie evidence of inten-
tion upon the part of the person, company or corporation to unfairly discriminate
between different sections"
Ii is to be noted that no provision is made for a possible higher operating cost in one
section of the state than in another. It would appear that the chains can not price
their articles with reference to the expenses of conducting business in a particular sec-
tion, but must average them over the state. Through the use of supermarkets, operating
expenses might be cut considerably in a given locality, but these savings can not be
passed along to the consumer.
'No express provision is to be found in the acts of Ariz., Ark., Neb., and Wyo.
permitting the lowering of a price to meet competition..
1*23 F. Supp. 70 (D. Minn. 1938).
'bLawvs 1937, c. 116, part II, § 2.
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part of the state at price lower than those exacted by the same person in
other parts of the state, where the effect is to lessen, injure, destroy or pre-
vent competition. The court held that the legislature's attempt to declare
illegal honest price variations based solely on differences in sales costs at
different stores was arbitrary and an unfair discrimination between mer-
-chants owning one store in one locality and those owning more than one
store and doing business in more than one locality.
The sales below cost acts are also in a certain measure anti-chain store
laws since they are directed at the elimination of "loss leaders", a sales
policy which has been widely attributed to chain stores.64 These acts, which
are to be found in fifteen states, 65 range from those which merely prohibit
the sale below cost 66 to the one in MinnesotaP7 which provides that "any
sale made by the retail vendor at less than ten per cent above the manu-
facturer's published list price . . . or in the absence of such a list price,
at not less than 15% above the current delivered invoice or replacement
cost, shall be prima facie evidence of a violation of this act". This legis-
lation is particularly burdensome, not only because it has been the practice
of such organizations to sell certain quick-moving non-perishable products
at a price close to the market price, but also because the statute provides
that the markup must be added to the current replacement cost or "list
price" of the merchandise. Since this price is subject to any number of
discounts the chain is unable to pass these discounts on to the consumer. 68
III
The struggle over the right of chain stores to dispense food has given
rise to another type of state law which is directed largely against the five
and ten cent stores and drug outlets. The movement is sponsored by
restauranteurs and labor union groups.69 While numerous bills have
"LEBHAR, THE CHAIN STORE-BOON OR BANE? (1931) 178; NYSTROm, EcoNomIcs
OF. RETAILING (1930) Vol. 1, p. 258; Grant, Loss Leader Selling in Chain Stores (1929)
PRINTERS' INK, Sept. 1929.
"Of the states with price discrimination laws only Idaho and Iowa are without
sales below cost acts. Other states having such acts include Ky., Md., Pa., S. C.,
-and Tenn. All these states have chain store taxes.
"The term "cost" as used in most acts is defined as applied to production, as in-
cluding the cost of raw materials, labor and all overhead expenses of the producer;
and as applied to distribution, it means the invoice or replacement cost, whichever is
lower, of the article or product to the distributor and vendor plus tle cost of doing
business by said distributor and vendor.
'"Minn. Laws 1937, c. 116. Nebraska, Oregon, and Tennessee have 6% provisions.
"A. and P. Goes to the Wars, FORTUNE, April, 1938, p. 63. On the subject of unfair
practice acts see McAllister, Price Control in the United States-a Survey (1937) 4
LAW AND CONTEMP. PRoR. 273, 297; Gerther, Solidarity in the Distribntion Trades in
Relation to the Control of Price Competition (1937) 4 LAW AND CONTEMP. PROB. 375,
386; Gerther, Experience in California with Fair Trade Legislation Restricting Price
Cutting (1936) 24 CALIF. L. REv. 640; Copp, The Unfair Practices Act (1936) 10
So. CALmF. L. REv. 18.
"Hanson, Restaurdits (1934) 13 ENCY. Soc. ScIENcEs; 336, 337, gives figures of
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been introduced in various legislatures upon the subject, only one state at
present 70 has so restricted the dispensing of food as to eliminate the chains
from this field.
IV
The various state resale price maintenance laws and the federal Miller-
Tydings Act 7' also have a direct and substantial effect upon the prices of
chain stores. This legislation is ostensibly to protect manufacturers of
branded articles from having the good will of their products injured and
the even flow of their distribution disrupted by price-cutting dealers. How-
ever, there is strong evidence that the real movement started with organiza-
tions of retailers, the bitterest opponents of chain stores, who desired to have
high resale prices maintained in order to obtain, for themselves, larger
profits.72
The epidemic quality of legislation is interestingly evidenced in the history
of the spread of these acts. The movement originated in California in
1931. By 1936 nine states had enacted similar legislation. After the con-
stitutionality of the California act was upheld by the United States Supreme
Court in 1936,73 twenty-eight states put legislation of this type upon their
books within a period of eight months.
Under the state acts, in order to establish a resale price on his branded
product, a manfacturer has merely to make one contract with a retailer
stipulating the price at which the article is to be resold, and notice being
34,844 drug stores with food bars, 60,607 confectionery stores with fountains and an
unknown number of department stores with fountains and restaurants. In the state
of Colorado 650 stores and in California 2,129 drug stores are engaged in the vending
of food according to DRUG Topics, Jan. 18, 1937, Feb. 15, 1937, and it is reported
that in these stores this business represents about 2617 of the total business and from
30% to 40% of the total profit.
Col. Laws 1935, c. 118.
1'26 STAT. 209 (1890), as amended by Public Act No. 314, 75th Cong., 15 U. S. C. A.
§ 1 (Supp. 1938).
"See minority view of the members of the Committee on the District of Columbia,
Part 2, of Senate Report of July 8, 1937. "The National Retail Druggists' association
printed instructions to its state and local lobbying members that they were to proceed
as quietly as possible and so secure as many other types of retailers as possible so as
to present a better front. My information is that in only three states were there public
hearings upon these important price-fixing measures. I am receiving information,
however, that consumers' groups are now organizing opposition in some states because
they have discovered the malign effects of price-fixing legislation. I am informed that
the National Association of Retail Druggists so controlled the situation in relation
to the desired state enactments, and so unacquainted were many of the legislators with
the provisions of the bill that 11 states passed bills tendered to them by the drug inter-
ests, each one of which contained a stenographic error, which resulted in the principal
paragraph being meaningless so that a New Jersey court recently ruled the law
to be unenforcible." In such manner does the sovereign make its laws.
"'Old Dearborn Distributing Co. v. Seagram-Distillers Corp., and McNeil v. Joseph
Triner Corp., 299 U. S. 183, 81 L. ed. 109, 57 Sup. Ct. 139 (1936); The Pep Boys,
Manny, Moe and Jack v. Pyroil Sales Company, 299 U. S. 198, 81 L. ed. 122, 57
Sup. Ct. 147 (1936).
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given to all other distributors (either by the manufacturer, or by the con-
tracting dealer, or in any other manner), all retail outlets are thereby bound
by the contract. Any variations from the stipulated price are actionable
by anyone who has been injured by such price deviation. Because of this,
even though one distributor purchasing in larger quantities can secure a
better price for the merchandise, or by virtue of the efficiency of his
organization can actually distribute at a lower cost than a less efficient
distributor, he is unable to pass these savings along to the consumer if the
article has been covered by such a contract. The public is deprived of the
benefits of efficient distribution in this manner in order to provide profits
for less capable independent retailers.74
V
The final type of anti-chain store legislation to be considered is the
Robinson-Patman Act. 75  Prior to this act chain stores had a buying ad-
IGerther, Experience in California with Legislation Restricting Price-cutting, supra
note 68, at 676. "There can be no doubt that resale price maintenance under the Cali-
fornia Fair Trade Act has made for higher prices on advertised products sold through
cut-rate and chain store institutions. . . . In the metropolitan centers retail prices
on advertised items were inimediately raised on the average about one-third over 1933
prices and one-fourth of 1934 contractual prices insofar as they went up to the
contractual level."
In New York under the Feld-Crawford Act, "Retailers are now forced by law
to collect margins as follows:
Mark-up on cost.
Cosmetics 65.6%
Drugs 57.2
Liquors 56.2
Books 70.4
Miscellaneous 60.2
"In other words, the efficient distributor, Who does not need any such margin on
these items to make a satisfactory profit on a satisfactory volume of sales, is required
by law to take this additional profit. Naturally the increased price to the consumer
may result in a reduced volume of sales and no more than his present total of profit
for the year's business. But the consumer must pay the increased price, and particularly
the consumer who thinks it is worth while to make his purchases at the popular-price
chain stores throughout New York City and the 'downtown popular-price department
stores. It is no doubt true that many drug stores are still charging the same prices
that they formerly charged but the consumer's opportunity of buying these price fixed
articles for less has been foreclosed." Minority view of the members of the Committee
on the District of Columbia, supra note 72.
For the international situation, see Gerther, Resale Price Maintenance in Great
Britain, UNIV. OF CALIF. PUBLICATIONS IN EcoNomrcs, Vol. II, No. 3, 257, where it is
pointed out that chains have thrived in foreign countries with effective price protection,
and have not been seriously hampered by a prohibition against underselling. The
largest chain in the world is reputed to exist in Great Britain, a country with rather
strict price control, and in Germany, the chains have not been seriously affected by
price control. The burden, of course, falls upon the consumer. TRADE REG. REv. No. 3,
March, 1937, p. 4.
For a general discussion of State Fair Trade Acts and court decisions under such
acts see notes in (1937) 22 CORNELL L. Q. 445; (1937) 50 HARv. L. REv. 667; (1937)
23 VA. L. REv. 914; (1936) 36 COL. L. REv. '293; (1936) 49 HAaRv. L. REv. 811;
(1936) 13 N. Y. U. L. Q. REv. 267; (1936) 45 YALE L. J. 672.
'Pub. Act. No. 692, 74th Cong., 15 U. S. C. A. § 13 (Supp. 1938).
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vantage over independent wholesale dealers, an advantage which usually
was in the form of discounts. 76  These were of three kinds, promotional
allowances, volume allowances and brokerage allowances. 77  The proper use
of this discount system would seem to be unobjectionable because of the
services rendered the manufacturers by the multiple unit organizations in
newspaper and window advertising, and because of savings to the manu-
facturer accompanying large order purchasing and direct dealing with
the consequent elimination of brokers and their commission. 78 That there
have been abuses of the discount system is undeniable. But it is submitted
that the abuses of the system should be eliminated and not the system itself
prohibited.
It is rather difficult to determine whether the purpose of the act is to
correct abuses or to abolish the use of discounts entirely.79 It is equally
difficult to determine just how effectively the act will function.8 0 At all
"'Mr. Justice Roberts said in The Great Atlantic and Pacific Tea Company v. Grosjean,
supra note 40, 422: "One striking illustration is furnished by the uncontradicted proof
the Atlantic and Pacific Company received, in the year 1934, from its vendors, secret
rebates, allowances, and brokerage fees amounting to $8,105,000 which were demanded
by the company as a condition of purchasing from the rendors in question. The
leverage which accomplished this was the enormous purchasing power of the company."
As a sidelight to this case it is to be noted that the court cited this as an advantage
of large chain organizations at a time when such practices had to a large extent been
declared illegal under the Robinson-Patman Act.
See Federal Trade Commission, Final Report on the Chain Store Investigation, p. 90;
Phillips, The Robinson-Patman Anti-Price Discrimination Law and the Chain Store
(1936) 15 HARv. Bus. REv. 62.
'Phillips, supra note 76, at 64.
"Id. at 64 et seq.
'It is the hope of Representative Wright Patman of Texas, the author of the bill,
to eliminate chain stores completely. He states, for example, with respect to discounts,
in a paper entitled Equal Opportunity in Business, for presentation at the 34th annual
meeting of the National Petroleum Asso., Atlantic City, Sept. 17, 1936: "It is ad-
mitted that a train load shipment can be made at much less cost per car than a single
car shipment. If, however, lower rates were permitted in such a case, large dealers
would be able to destroy small dealers. Our quantity provision will apply to all
modes of transportation, including trucks, barges and railroads. This quantity limit
will be fixed by the Federal Trade Commission and I presume at an equal amount to
a car lot in most cases but smaller quantities in others. One who purchases such a
'fixed quantity' from a manufacturer will be permitted to receive it for the same price
and terms as one who purchases many hundred such fixed quantities; the same theory
that one who causes one car load of freight to be transported pays the same price per
car as the one who ships thousands of cars at the same time."
'For a period after the passage of the act, The Great Atlantic and Pacific Tea
Company eliminated all discounts whatsoever. In the spring of 1937, however, the
company reverted to its original policy. The Federal Trade Commission centered
an attack upon such practices and issued a cease and desist order. TimE, April 12, 1937;
NEws WEEx, March 13, 1937, p. 20; Id., April 10, 1937, p. 37. The chain intends to
appeal to the courts, arguing that the discounts received were "non-discriminatory",
and were "available to purchasers on proportionally equal terms". See Direct Buying
Under the Robinson-Patinan Act, Brief of The Great Atlantic and Pacific Tea Company
filed with the Federal Trade Commission, Dec. 1937.
On the act generally, see Learned and Isaacs, The Robinson-Patinan Law: Some
Assumptions and Expectations (1937) 15 HARV. Bus. REv. 137; Copeland, The Problem
of Administering the Robinson-Patman Act (1937) 15 HARV. Bus. REv. 156; A Sym-
posium on Price Discrimination and Price Cutting (1937) 4 LAW AND CONTEMP. PROD.
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events, it has been definitely established that the benefits that chains have
received through their purchases is a relatively small factor in accounting
for the differential in prices existing between chain stores and independent
merchants.81
In considering the effect which legislation has had upon multiple unit
stores, a few observations upon the effect that the chain system has had upon
the costs of the distribution of merchandise might not be entirely inappro-
priate. When Mr. Hoover was Secretary of Commerce, he said that at least
eight billion dollars was wasted annually through inefficient marketing.8 2
Estimates show that one third of every American dollar spent at retail stores
in the early nineteen-twenties covered the actual cost of production, while
the other two thirds were absorbed in distribution.83 The present gross
margin of chain stores, according to the Federal Trade Commission,84 is
20% to 25% of sales. Inasmuch as these stores do most .of their business
with consumers whose annual incomes do not exceed $2,300 per annum,8 5
any increase or decrease in the prices of merchandise distributed by these
stores will have its greatest effect upon those marginal consumers who can
least afford to meet an increase in the cost of living.
The task and accomplishment of these organizations has been to reduce
271 et seq. (particularly McNair, Marketing Functions and Costs under the Robinson-
Patman Act, id. at 334; George, Business and the Robinson-Patman Act: The First
Year, id. at 392; McLaughlin, Cost and the Robinson-Patinan Act, Possibilities of a
Strict Construction, id. at 410) ; Gell, Further Aspects of the Robinson-Patinan Anti-
Price Discrimination Act (1937) 7 LAw Soc. J. 856; Smith, The Robinson-Patman Act
in Practice (1937) 35 MicH. L. REV. 705; Gallagher, The Robinson-Patinan Act (1937)
2 JOHN MARSHALL L. Q. 464; Hamilton and Loevinger, Second Attack on Price Dis-
crimination, the Robinson-Patman Act (1937) 22 WASH. UNIV. L. Q. 153; Notes
(1936) 50 HARV. L. REV. 106; (1936) 24 GEo. L. J. 951; (1937) 46 YALE L. J. 447;
(1937) 85 U. OF PA. L. REv. 306.
'In the grocery field by far the largest part of the chain store's advantages is
definitely not a result of special discounts, since of the 1.73% by which the independent's
cost of merchandise exceeds that of the chain, but .45% can be traced to special con-
cessions. In the Federal Trade Commission's cost studies for groceries it was revealed
that 16.4% of the independent's higher selling price is a result of a greater cost of
merchandise while 83.6% is caused by a larger gross margin. See supra note 25.
"BUEHLER, CHAIN STORE DEBATE MANUAL (1931) 26. In an address by Herbert
Hoover before the National Distribution Conference, Chamber of Commerce of the
United States, Wash., D. C., Jan. 14, 1925, it was stated: "The outstanding problem
of our distribution system can be easily summarized in one question. Can we reduce
the margin between our farmers and manufacturing producers on one side, and our
consumers on the other? . . . I believe that in so doing we can make the greatest
contribution to the improvement of the position of our farmers and that we can make
a contribution to lowered costs of living." BLOOMFIELD, TRENDS IN RETAIL DISTmU-
TION (1930) p. 51. See also radio address of Dr. Julius Klien, Assistant Secretary
of Commerce, May 4, 1929, found in SOMERVILLE, CHAIN STORE DEBATE MANUAL
(1930) 25. See Plaintiff's brief in Louis K. Liggett Co. v. Lee, supra note 36.
"BUEHLER, supra note 82, at 26.
"'Supra note 25. In SOMERVILLE, supra note 82, at 72, it is claimed that out of every
dollar spent at The Great Atlantic and Pacific Tea Co. 83.5 cents goes to the manu-
facturer, 14 cents for local expenses, and 2.5 cents profit.
"Dayton D. McKean, The Spread of Chain Store Taxces (1936) NEW REPUBLIC,
May 27, 1936.
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the cost of distribution from the manufacturer to the consumer to the
minimum, both of whom have profited through this efficient distribution.
Although chain stores formerly were charged with maltreating farmers
and producers, within the last three or four years they have been the greatest
single factor in the country in stabilizing prices in times of overproduction,
thereby saving producers from the threats of complete liquidation.8 6  Im-
measurable benefits have likewise accrued to the government because of
this action.
The immediate apparent result of this legislation has been a contraction in
the number of chain store units.8 7 If they wish to continue in business under
a unit tax two paths are open to the chain stores. They may lease their
separate units to their managers and operate as a voluntary chain, the
organization acting primarily as a manufacturing and distributing agency,
with a considerable extension in this field,88 or they may consolidate their
'"This has been notable in the turkey industry, potatoes, dried fruits, apples and many
other industries. The most outstanding piece of work done in this line was in beef.
"The drought situation led to a request for chain aid from the packers and cattle
raisers in the middle of June 1936. During July, while the campaign was being laid
out, prices dropped steadily. In the week ending July 8, steer of good grade were
selling at $8.00 per cwt. By .the first of August when the month long drive got
under way, they had dropped to $7.50. By the third week of August they were back
to $8.25 and by the middle of Sept. after the drive had ended they had risen another
45 cents. Prices were boosted despite an increase in slaughterings over 1935; a 24.5%
increase in July and a 15.9% increase in August. Total consumption of beef and veal
in August was 11.1% higher than a year earlier. Part of this increase was due to
lower prices which averaged about 8% less for the month than in August 1935 but
cattlemen credit the chains in large measure for obviating a catastrophe. The govern-
ment which had to purchase 2,500,000 steers to relieve the ravages of the drought in
1934 bought only 5,000 cattle in 1936." Bus. WEEK, March 5, 1938, p. 31.
See statement of W. F. Jensen, Manager of the American Association Creamery
Butter Manufacturers in New York Produce Review and American Creamery, Jan. 29,
1930, with respect to the co-operation received from the chains and particularly the
A. and P. in the distribution of butter when increased consumer demand was necessary.
"'In the year ending Feb. 1, 1938, the number of A. and P. stores declined from
14,747 to 13,531. In 1934 the chain had 15,082 outlets. In 1929 there were- 148,037
chain stores in the United States. In 1933 it dropped to 141,676 and in 1935 to 127,482.
STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF THE UNITED STATES (1937). Every chain store that is closed
means the loss of a job for five men, counting managers, clerks, warehousemen, and
office assistants. Their average aggregate salary is between $8,000 and $10,000 per
annum. Closing a store also means loss of store rental averaging $1,500 per year or
better. Bus. WEEK, June 15, 1937, p. 23.
6'When Iowa enacted its chain store law in 1935, the Standard Oil of Indiana, de-
cided that its 850 service stations in that state could not stand the increased tax
burdens, so the firm rented its Iowa retail outlets to individuals and turned all leased
stations back to their owners. This proved so profitable that the company extended the
plan to several other states. NEWS WEEK, May 29, 1937, p. 25.
Such a plan would appear to be impossible under the Pennsylvania Act which provides
(1937, P. L. 1656, § 6; PA. STAT. ANN. (Purdon Supp. 1938) tit. 72, § 3420-6) "Two
or more stores or theatres shall, for the purpose of this act, be considered under the
same general management, supervision, or ownership if, directly or indirectly, controlled
by a single person or any group of persons having a common interest in such stores
or theatres, or if any part of the gross revenues, net revenues or profits from any
such stores or theatres, shall directly or indirectly, be required to be immediately or
ultimately made available as rental or in any other manner Whatsoever for the bene-
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units into super-units of distribution.8 9 To a certain extent both measures
have been adopted.
What the future has to offer in the way of legislation on this subject
is difficult to determine.9 0 Despite the fact that chain store taxes have been
repealed in two states,91 and despite the fact that opponents of this type
of legislation are becoming constantly stronger and better organized,92 the
ficial use, or shall directly or indirectly, inure to the immediate or ultimate benefit
of any single person or any group of persons having a common interest therein." It
would seem also that this language is broad enough to include voluntary chains.
'In Pittsburg within two years the A. and P. has established seven super-markets
with as many more in nearby areas. Among them are 4 or 5 of the largest outlets
of the chain, grossing upward of a half million dollars a year, ten times the volume
that moves through the average A. and P. Store. Bus. WEEK, July 3, 1937, p. 26.
'Not quite so difficult to determine is the position of Mr. Justice Black upon such
legislation. In the United States Senate on Jan. 8, 1930, then Senator, Black stated:
"Chain store systems are entering into every town and village in the United States.
They are destroying business initiative of the individuals who built up those communi-
ties. . . .The little chains are being absorbed by the bigger ones. One springs up in
my home town of Birmingham today. Tomorrow it is merged into a larger one. The
next day it is merged into a still larger one, and they continue the merging, thus
gradually concentrating into one center. Chain groceries, chain dry good stores, chain
drug stores, chain clothing stores, here today and merged tomorrow-grow in size and
power. . . .We are rapidly becoming a Nation of a few business masters and many
clerks and servants. The local business man and merchant is passing, and his com-
munity loses his contribution to local affairs as an independent thinker, and executive.
A wild craze for efficiency in production, sales and distribution has swept over
the land, increasing the number of unemployed, building up a caste system dangerous
to any government."
"The potato growers were responsible to a large extent in the repeal of the chain
store tax in Maine. LITERARY DIGEST, June 12, 1937, p. 36. In California after the
legislature had passed a chain store act it came up for referendum. After a great deal
of organizing by the chains working with Lord and Taylor, a New York advertising
agency, the measure was killed by 64% of the voters. See Woodward, How to Swing
an Election-Why California Repealed the Chain Store Tax, THE NATION, Dec. 11,
1937, p. 638; The LessonI from California, an editorial in THE PROGRESSIVE GROCER, Dec.,
1936, p. 31. Statisticians figured that this tax ranging from $2 per single store to $500
for ten or over, would have raised 1.1 millions per year and would have pushed the
price of food and other necessaries up from 5% to 10%. Bus. WEEK, Sept. 21, 1935.
, On November 8, 1938, the electorate of Colorado voted "No" to a referendum to
repeal the chain store tax of the state, the vote being 230,000 to 160,000. N. Y. Tim",
Nov. 10, 1938, p. 49. This tax, CoLo. STAT. ANN. (Michie, 1935) c. 161, is the only
chain store tax which was enacted into law by public vote. Initiated measure No. 7,
adopted Nov. 6, 1934.
'Agriculturists, former opponents of chain stores, as has been seen have become
allied to them in this struggle. Manufacturers likewise, realizing that a continuation
of this legislation will drive the chains out of the retail business and into manufacturing,
distributing their products to the members of the voluntary chains into which the
present chain organizations would undoubtedly be converted, as well as to retail outlets
presently outside the chain, prefer to see them continue in business as distributing agents
rather than as competitors. With the widespread education of the consumers there
are bound to be found many opponents of chain legislation.
Voluntary chains are looking askance at such legislation because there have been
very definite indications that the next move on the part of the states is to tax them
out of business also. In Georgia the Attorney General has indicated that he will try
to stretch application of the tax to cover both chains and voluntary associations. Bus.
WEEK, May 22, 1937, p. 15. And similar sentiments were echoed by Hon. Sol Bloom
in the Congressional investigation prior to the passage of the Robinson-Patman Act.
A. and P. Goes to the Wars, FORTUNE, April 1938, 63. The result has been that the
Pennsylvania Grocers' Association spent $100,000 in allying with the chains to fight the
taxes. LITERARY DIGEST, June 12, 1937, p. 36.
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battle continues on many fronts. This past spring the Schwartzwald chain
store bill was introduced into the New York legislature. 93  The author of
the Robinson-Patman Act has now proposed a death statute on chain stores
which will achieve their complete extinction in two years after passage. 94
While it seems distinctly improbable that this measure will become law, there
is quite a possibility that the national legislators, in seeking desperately
for more revenue that, to some extent, will meet their expenditures, may
seize upon a modified form of the bill as a solution of their problem.
There are some indications that this type of legislation in the future will
not be confined to corporate chains but will also embrace voluntary asso-
ciations of independent dealers.95
The immediate prospect for the ultimate consumer is a gloomy one.
Without any increase in legislation, an increase in the cost of living seems
inevitable due to the present taxes, the financial burdens of diverse regu-
latory devices and: the costly litigations relating to them. Though the
chains do a rather small percentage of the total retail business, 90 an increase
in their prices will certainly be reflected in all retail sales, inasmuch as they
have been the sole factor in preserving low prices in the past.
Since the present policy of the government is to stabilize industry and
particularly to plan production, it seems strange that an antipathy to planned
distribution in the finest form should be so prominent. It is not uncon-
trovertably true that the current problem of overproduction which has
"This measure calls for a graduated tax of $10 to $550 per chain store in the state,
based on the total number of stores in the system operating both in and out of the
state of New York. NEwSDoM, Feb. 26, 1938, p. 3; March 5, 1938, p. 3. Those op-
posing the measure include the Real Estate Association of New York State, Leadership
Institute, New York Board of Trade, Broadway Association, Brooklyn Real Estate
Board, New York State Turkey Growers, Central Mercantile Association, Washington
Truth Society, Crusaders, Inc., Citizens Union, United Real Estate Owners Associa-
tion, Uptokvn Chamber of Commerce, 34th Street-Midtown Association, Merchants
Association of New York, 23rd St. Midtown Asso., West Side Association of Commerce,
and Brooklyn Consumers' Committee.
"The bill provides for a federal chain store tax ranging from a minimum of $50
per store for chains operating less than 10 units up to $1,000 a store for those operating
more than 500 outlets, these being multiplied by the number of states, including the Dis-
trict of Columbia, in which any chain operates. National chains would pay $49,000 per
store for each outlet in excess of 500. This would amount to a tax of $524,000,000 on the
A. and P. or 60% of the 1937 sales volume and 6,000% of its 1937 net profit. See
FORTUNE, supra note 92; Bus. WEEK, Feb. 5, 1938, p. 17; Editorial, Killing Chain Stores,
Bus. WEEK, Feb. 5, 1938, 48.
This bill as introduced in 1938, H. R. 9464, was in committee last July when Con-
gress adjourned. Its author, recently re-elected, has announced that the bill will be
introduced January 3, 1939, as H. R. 1. As far as is ascertainable, the National Retail
Druggists Association which was largely responsible for the federal and state retail
price maintenance acts is supporting this measure. There is substantial opposition to
the bill being furnished by chain stores, voluntary retail chains, mahufacturer's asso-
ciations, the grange associations, and lately, the American Federation of Labor.
'See supra note 92.
"STATIsTIcAL ABSTRAcT OF THE UNITED STATES (1937) points out, (page 807, table
no. 824) that in 1929 the chains made 20% of the total retail, sales; in 1933, 25%;
and in 1935, 22%.
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proved a curse rather than a blessing can be solved only by decreasing
production. It is not inconceivable that in fostering chain stores by the
removal of the present prohibitory bans on those commercial ventures which
have made the greatest strides in solving the problem of distribution, would
yield an answer to the yet unsolved puzzle of widespread want prevailing
in a land of teeming plenty.
